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ABSTRACT

At the fifth annual Cal-State Hayward Conference in Rhetorical Criticism, upper division and graduate students from 14 western colleges and universities presented papers on the theory, history, and criticism of rhetoric. Panels of faculty members from the same colleges and universities selected the three best papers for commendation and publication. These papers were then revised and are included in this volume. The titles and authors are "The Rhetoric of the First Grade Reader" by Virginia Kidd, "Symbolism, Narrative, History: Rhetorical Planes in 'The Octopus'" by Patricia Logue, and "Arthur Schopenhauer: Iconoclasm in Communication" by Gale Schroeder. The conference address by Dr. Wayne N. Thompson, "Plato's Symposium," is also included in this volume. (TO)

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CONFERENCE IN RHETORICAL CRITICISM

Commended Papers

Doreen K. F. Rose, Editor

John Hammerback, John E. Baird, Assistant Editors

California State College, Hayward — 1970

CS 500 894

— Foreword —

On May 9, 1970, the Speech and Drama Department of California State College, Hayward, held the Fifth Annual Conference in Rhetorical Criticism. In attendance were upper-division and graduate students as well as professors from fourteen colleges and universities of the western states. The students read papers on the theory, history, and criticism of rhetoric to panels of professors acting as editor-critics. The three papers in this volume were rated superior by the editor-critics and were revised for publication at the suggestion of the volume's editors. We are indebted to the participating professors for their deliberation over the papers and for their critical comments.

The featured speaker at this year's Conference was Professor Wayne N. Thompson, Chairman of the Speech Department at the University of Houston. During the Conference banquet Dr. Thompson enlightened his receptive audience with a penetrating discussion of "Plato's Symposium"; the text of Dr. Thompson's address is included in this volume. We express our special gratitude to Dr. Thompson for his scholarly contribution to the Conference and for his enthusiastic participation in the activities of the day.

Student and Faculty Participants

STUDENT PARTICIPANTS

Bostick, Allan	Oliver, Jeff
Comp, Linda	Olton, Michael
Delury, Carolyn	Rose, D. K.
Engelhardt, Bert	Schroeder, Gale
Gamba, Barbara	Schwartz, Gerald
Hall, Alice	Sheklow, Marde
Hutton, Christine	Smith, Roger
Kidd, Virginia	Spencer, Michael
Kinsey, Eugene	Stanley, Owen
Logue, Patricia	Willey, Shirley
Milchen, Judy	

EDITOR-CRITICS

Professors:

Baird, John E., California State College, Hayward
Benjamin, R. L., San Diego State College
Bochin, Hal, Fresno State College
Cambus, John, California State College, Hayward
Campbell, Karlyn, California State College, Los Angeles
Hammerback, John, California State College, Hayward
Hauth, Lester, California State College, Long Beach
Hennings, Ralph, Fresno State College
Jenkins, Steve, Sacramento State College
Lewis, Albert, Central Washington State College
Loebs, Bruce, Idaho State University
McEdwards, Mary, San Fernando Valley State College
Mohrmann, G.P., University of California, Los Angeles
Mouat, L.H., San Jose State College
Shearer, Ned, University of California, Los Angeles
Wurthman, Leonard, San Fernando Valley State College

DIRECTORS OF THE CONFERENCE

James Johnson, Robert Martin, Candy Rose

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

9:30 Briefing: Multi-Purpose Room, Hayward High School

10:00 Critics' Silent Review of Papers in Sections

10:00 "Americana 1970" — A Readers' Theatre Production,
Directed by Dr. Melvin R. White

12:00 Lunch

1:00 Presentation of Papers in Sections
Presentation
Comments of Critics
Decision for Commendation and Publication

4:00 Reading of Commended Papers to Entire Conference

5:30 No-host Social Hour, The Ranch Restaurant

7:30 Dinner: Hayward High School Cafeteria

Introducing the Speaker: Dr. Robert C. Martin
Chairman, Speech-Drama Department
California State College, Hayward

Speaker: Dr. Wayne N. Thompson
Professor of Speech and Department Chairman
University of Houston

"Plato's Symposium"

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PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM

by

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Dr. Wayne N. Thompson

“Last fall when Dr. Martin invited me to be the guest speaker for this fine conference, I went through the same creative pains that some of you probably went through when you began work on your papers. What to write about? What topic would be appropriate? What could I do that would be worthy of this occasion? What was I most interested in that would be appropriate? And I think that no one was more surprised at my final choice than I was because for many years I've been a devoted Aristotelian. In fact I feel a little disloyal this evening over turning Platoists. Perhaps you can help me keep my straying very quiet.

A little more seriously, there are three reasons that I chose Plato's *Symposium* as a topic. First, the work is a great delight; I've had fun lecturing on it in my classical rhetoric class as a work that my students should know something about. Second, no one has dealt with the symposium in any serious way. And third, as I thought more and more about the *Symposium*, I came to the conclusion that a serious analysis of it might tend to solve some of the obscurities about Plato as a rhetorician, about some of his true views on rhetoric.

For example, there's that much debated and never settled question, “Did Plato hate all rhetoric, or was it only sophistic rhetoric that he hated?” You've heard that question before, I'm sure; and maybe some of you think you know the answer, you won't have much trouble proving you are right — either way you answer for you can find some honest-to-goodness experts that will agree with you either way. In an earlier draft of this speech I had some fine quotations, most of which I have deleted. Oscar Brownstein in the *QJS*, December 1965, concludes, “. . . but none of this will make Plato a lover of rhetoric. To argue that his criticism was directed merely against the rhetoricians of his own time, however, is wholly specious, for his objections to rhetoric are as fundamental as his objections to poetry.” And I had a similar quotation from Peter J. Schakel in the *Southern Speech Journal* agreeing with Brownstein, and quotations on the other side from Otis Walter, W. Scott Nobles, Reginald Hackforth, Benjamin Jowett, and Lane Cooper, all seeming to say that what Plato was really against was bad rhetoric.

But there are some other questions about Plato as a rhetorician that we can't answer satisfactorily on the

basis of studying only the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*. From those works we know much that he disliked, but on the positive side we know that he favored a rhetoric that served truth and that he thought that its foundations must be — and here I quote Benjamin Jowett — “founded on knowledge of truth and knowledge of character.” Those are important, very important, guidelines, and it can be argued that all that Plato wanted to do in the *Phaedrus* and the *Gorgias* was to offer guidelines, but wouldn't it be interesting to have a few more details? And, as I shall argue later in this paper, in these two works we don't even have an acceptable example of the model speech, as judged by Plato's standards.

So, in closing this introduction, let me pose a challenge to you classical rhetoricians. How many statements can you make about Plato's theories of rhetoric on the basis of the *Phaedrus* and the *Gorgias*? You can say, “he detested the rhetoric of the sophists. He believed that rhetoric should serve truth. He believed that rhetoric should be founded on psychology.” But how many additional statements can you make, excepting perhaps some elaboration of why he despised?

But before I go to the analysis of the *Symposium* for its rhetorical insights, let me summarize this delightful work. For many of you a summary is no doubt superfluous, but I would like for all of us to start from common ground.

The occasion for the symposium was Agathon's victory in the contest in writing Greek tragedy, supposedly 416 B.C. And in celebration of this a group of prominent Athenians had assembled at the villa of Agathon. About thirty years later the Dialogue itself was supposedly written. Apollodorus is the first speaker, he refers to Aristodemus as the one who was the eye witness to these events. And so we find Aristodemus speaking near the beginning of the dialogue: “I happened to meet Socrates fresh from the bath wearing sandals — no ordinary doings with him and I asked him whether he was bound that he had made himself up so fine.” And he replied, “To dine with Agathon. Yesterday in fact I escaped when he invited me to his sacrifice for the victory being afraid of the crowd, but agreed to be with him today. That is why I'm all dressed up — in order to be beautiful. But you, how do you

feel about going to a dinner uninvited?" And said Aristodemus, "I feel like doing whatever you bid." And then Aristodemus tells something about the journey through the streets of Athens to the villa of Agathon. Socrates lags behind and Aristodemus continues, "When I reached the house of Agathon I found the door wide open. A servant came right out to meet me. Then the moment Agathon saw me he called out - Aristodemus you've just come in time to dine with us. If you are here for any other reason, put the thing off till later. The fact is I've been hunting you since yesterday - but what of Socrates; you didn't bring him to us?" And said Aristodemus, "I turned around and didn't see Socrates behind me. I was wondering myself where he could be." Whereupon Agathon said to a slave, "Go boy, look for Socrates and bring him in. As for you Aristodemus recline by Ariscimicus."

Socrates finally arrives, not as late as was ordinarily the case with him, but certainly when they were half way through their dinner. Agathon, since he happened to be the last one reclining by himself said, "Socrates come here and lie beside me so that by touching you I may share the enjoyment of your knowledge." And Socrates sat down. Socrates, as was his custom if he had something to philosophise about, would stop whatever he was doing and stand there until he had worked out the philosophic problem.

This is the second day of the celebration. The day before was spent in a drunken orgy. The men decide that they don't want to do this again, and so the question arises - what are they going to do to celebrate Agathon's great victory. They all agree not to turn the gathering that day to drunkenness, but drink no more than would conduce to pleasure. And finally Phaedrus has an idea, and Aricimus says: "My notion is in fact that each of us be required to give a speech in praise of love - the finest he can devise, going from left to right, beginning with Phaedrus because he has the leaders place and is father of the plan as well.

So this is the setting for the symposium. They decided that giving speeches was better entertainment than getting drunk and they set up the contest in giving speeches all on the common theme of love. These are epideictic speeches, of course. So we have a speech by Phaedrus, and a speech by Pausanias, and then it is time for Aristophanes the great poet to speak. But Aristophanes is unable to speak, he says, "Aricimus, by rights you should either stop my hiccups or else take my turn in speaking till I leave off by myself." "Come now," said Aricimus, "I shall do both. I will indeed speak in your place and when you have stopped your hiccupping you shall speak in mine." Now we get Greek medical advice on how to stop the hiccups: "And meanwhile as I speak, if you will try holding your breath a good long time the hiccups will stop, or if they don't, gargle with water. If however, they are quite persistent take something that will tickle your nose and sneeze. And if you will do this once or twice

its persistence will stop." "Begin your speech without delay," said Aristophanes, "And I will do as you say." Much of this is written at several levels and there is supposed to be great symbolic significance in the fact that Aristophanes had the hiccups, causing a reversal in the speaking order. But my purpose is not to analyze the symposium from that viewpoint.

We have the speech of Aricimus, then the one by Aristophanes - a very imaginative speech in which he tells about the early days when there were three sexes rather than two. The third sex was the two combined, making a creature with four legs and four arms, and when this creature became excited and wanted to move more rapidly, it just rolled over and over like a great ball using all its limbs for this purpose.

Then we have the speech of Agathon, the speech presented by Socrates, with the help of Diotima. Alcibiades arrives very drunk and creates quite a commotion. And he gives a speech in praise of Socrates. So we have six epideictic speeches on the topic of love, and a final epideictic speech in praise of an individual.

This speech by Alcibiades is largely on the fortitude, the physical endurance of Socrates. Plato wanted Socrates to excel in every possible way, including these physical attributes, and so, we get to the very end of the dialogue which closes as follows:

Thereupon Aristodemus said, 'Aricimus and Phaedrus and some others took their leave. As for himself, he fell asleep and slept very heavily because the nights were long and he did not awaken till towards the day when the cocks already were crowing. When he was awake he saw that everybody else was sleeping or had left, and only Agathon and Aristophanes and Socrates were still awake. And they were drinking from a mighty goblet passes from left to right, while Socrates was having a discussion with them. Aristodemus said that he did not remember all the argument since he had not been by from the beginning. And besides, his head was nodding. But the main thing was that Socrates compelled them gradually to admit that the same men would write comedy and tragedy, and that he who is through art a tragic poet, is a comic poet, too. This they were compelled to grant. Not following very well and nodding, Aristophanes was the first of them to go asleep, with Agathon following. Then Socrates, when he had laid them both to sleep, got up and went away. He went into the street of the lycium and took a bath and passed the day like any other. And having done so toward evening, he went home to rest.

So that's the work we're talking about tonight - not as a philosopher might, probing the several levels of meaning, but as rhetoricians. Now for the first main section of this paper, "What do we know about Plato's attitudes toward rhetoric through this analysis of the *Symposium*?"

Two things: First, a more favorable attitude; a greater respect for the craftsmanship of the sophist-rhetorician. A contrast here with the *Phaedrus* is instructive. Recall with me the miserable address that Plato constructed for Lysias in the *Phaedrus*. It did not define terms, "the parts of the speech," Socrates

observes, "had been tossed off topsy-turvy." It was a repetitious, long-winded rambling speech. Not only was it wrong morally but also it was deficient in the proficiencies of rhetoric as a technical art.

Reginald Hookforth says of it: "This tedious piece of rhetoric deserves little comment. It is a flat, monotonous, repetitive composition . . . in which little is discernible, the arguments being tacked or "glued" together by formulas of mechanical connection . . . And the flatness of the style is matched by the banality of the sentiment."

In the *Symposium* the situation is different – at least to a degree. The two sophists, Phaedrus and Pausanias, speak first, and this position probably indicates that Plato overall gave them the lowest position – inferior in prestige to the doctor, the poet, and the philosopher. However, as a logographer writing speeches adapted to the character of the speakers, Plato created for one of the sophists – Phaedrus – a speech that was technically excellent. The speech by Pausanias does not possess the same points of excellence, but I see some significance in the fact that Plato was willing to concede that at least one of the sophists was a master of his own craft – able to construct a speech that was admirable in structure, in clarity, in inventiveness, and in its use of a number of the devices of proof, including examples, enthymemes, arguments of probability, contrast, and proof by witnesses.

The second point on Plato's attitude toward rhetoric, as found in the *Symposium*, is one that reinforces what is perhaps the most significant single point made in the *Phaedrus*: The difference between false and true rhetoric is knowing and respecting truth. The parallel between the two works is striking. Plato not only makes the same point, but also does so in the same way. In the *Phaedrus*, the first speech by Socrates is an admirable specimen of sophistic rhetoric. It is followed by a dialogue in which Socrates specifies the crucial flaw. An invisible visitant checks Socrates for his foolish, impious speech and calls upon him to recant and to cleanse himself of his shame. Socrates, speaking of the speech of Lysias and his own, says: "Therein they both transgressed concerning Love; and, besides, the fatuity of both was absolutely droll, for, while neither of them contained a thing that was sound or true, they both assumed a solemn air . . . in the hope of cheating manikins and winning their applause." The third stage in the *Phaedrus* is the presentation by Socrates of a true masterpiece – one combining truth with the skills of the sophist-rhetorician.

The structure of one section of the *Symposium* is identical. Agathon gives a speech that is a rhetorical masterpiece by sophistic standards. It is clear, tightly structured, filled with plausible enthymemes. Beyond that, its invention shows great imagination and resourcefulness, and much of it soars in imagery to

heights of poetic beauty. Those present, other than Socrates, are taken in by Agathon's virtuosity. "When Agathon had finished speaking," so said Aristodemus, "all who were there applauded loudly; the young man obviously had spoken in a manner worthy of himself and of the god." And Socrates, though he immediately thereafter speaks in ironic criticism of Agathon's effort, acknowledges some admirable qualities: "And how . . . shall I be otherwise than at a loss, I or anybody else you please, who has to speak after a discourse as beautiful and varied as this has been delivered? And if the rest was not in equal measure wonderful, yet who could listen to the close without amazement at the beauty of the epithets and phrases?"

Then, as in the *Phaedrus*, a dialogue intervenes between the two speeches – the sophistic masterpiece and the true masterpiece. In the *Symposium* the criticism is the same; only the mechanism of expression is different. Here the method is a mixture of irony and direct statement: "In fact, I was stupid enough to think that in every case one ought to tell the truth about the subject of the praise, and that this must serve as basis . . . And I felt very proud indeed to think how well I was going to speak because I knew the real way of praising anything. But, seemingly, this was not the way of praising anything whatever finely. No! The way was to attribute to the object the greatest and the finest things one could conceive of, whether they were so or not. If false, that was no matter." For further emphasis Socrates adds that he will not speak if it means "good-bye to the truth."

And the parallel continues still further. In the *Symposium* after the short intervening dialogue setting forth the faults of the sophistic speech, Socrates presents an example of excellence in speechmaking. In the two works, therefore, argument and sequence are alike – a sophistic masterpiece, critique, a true masterpiece. And the flaw in the sophistic masterpiece is the same – the insensitivity to truth.

So much for the attitudes toward rhetoric that Plato manifests in the *Symposium* – more tolerant, more realistic, but insistent on the necessity for knowing truth. Now for the second part of this paper, which is on Plato's principles of rhetoric. Nowhere, as we all know, did Plato write down in any detail his principles of rhetoric. The second part of the *Phaedrus* is the only work that even comes close to dealing with this topic, and here the guidelines, though certainly important, are quite broad. Besides knowing the truth, one should define terms, organize well, be a philosopher, and know his audience.

So we cannot know much about Plato's rhetoric by reading his direct statements on the art. If we are to know any details, we must examine the speeches that he constructed, observe his rhetorical practices, and infer that these tell us something about his theories and favorite devices. There are certain risks in this undertaking, but I think that they are worth taking.

Here we have a considerable body of speechmaking to examine — seven speeches.

In the seven speeches, there is an abundance of evidence pointing to a series of precepts and practices. Let's make a game of this part of my paper. Let's suppose that Plato was writing a handbook for speakers — I can't imagine anything less Platolike, anything that Plato would have been any less likely to do; if his reincarnated soul is anywhere among us tonight, I will surely begin feeling some frightful vibrations. But let me take this risk and play the game of make-believe. What advice would Plato have put in his handbook if he had written one? First, on the canon of arrangement — in respect to epideictic speechmaking, let me remind you — what would he have said? Three things, I believe.

Number one, he would have said, "Keep the introductions and the conclusions simple." What do his introductions consist of? They point out errors in the preceding speech, they indicate the speaker's purpose, and they preview the oration. Clear and concise, they are restricted to serving the content of the speech. What don't they do? They do not embellish, conciliate, emphasize, or try to heighten attention. Conclusions, likewise, are brief, simple, and content oriented. Except for some brief references to the immediate surroundings, they are restricted to restating the thesis and summarizing main points.

Number two on arrangement, Plato would have said that an epideictic speech need not have any fixed number of parts. This position, also, is consistent with a larger view — namely, that conveying truth takes precedence over observing a rhetorical nicety. Phaedrus has three parts to his speech. Eryximachus and Aristophanes give four-part speeches: introduction, statement of thesis, body, conclusion. Agathon gives a five-part speech: introduction, thesis, partition, body, conclusion.

However, on a final aspect of arrangement, Book i, Chapter 3 of our imaginary handbook — Plato does seem to be prescriptive. Speeches of praise should follow certain lines of development. Both Agathon and Socrates speak on this point. Says Agathon: "yet the one right method, in every form of praise on every topic, is, namely, to explain the nature of the agent who is the subject of the speech, through which such and such effects are brought about. This therefore is the proper way for us to praise the God of Love; to tell first of his nature, then of his gifts." Socrates agrees, and I think without being ironical: "The right procedure, Agathon, as you explained, is first to tell what Eros is, and what he is like, and then to tell of his works."

Moving now to Plato's advice on invention, we can make some well-supported guesses. This is book ii, Chapter 1. "Adapt your speech to the remarks of the preceding speakers." The *Symposium* is filled with examples of adaptation — not only in the intro-

ductions but also in the bodies of the speeches. Agathon, for example, well along in his speech, says, "With Phaedrus I agree on many other points, but disagree on this, that Eros is of earlier date than Cronus and Iapetus." Later Agathon makes a similar adaptation through a reference to the earlier speech by Eryximachus.

On this matter of adaptation, however, there is a danger that we may mislead ourselves. All of us, I suspect, have become accustomed to viewing adaptation in the context of persuasive effectiveness — we adapt in order to persuade — and there is no evidence that Plato's frequent use of adaptation was for the same purpose. The speeches were not overtly and directly persuasive, and it seems likely that the function of adaptation was to provide continuity.

Book ii, Chapter 2, on speech composition: Plato believes in the value of internal summary. This device appears in several speeches, and in the address of Agathon it is conspicuous with a summary about every 300 words. These are brief, and often the summary is combined with a topic sentence that leads into the next section: "Now we have treated of the justice, temperance, and courage of the god. There remains his wisdom." "Concerning the beauty of the god let this suffice, though much remains unsaid. It is Love's virtues that must be our next consideration." In the other speeches internal summaries appear sufficiently often to justify the conclusion that this device is a favorite with Plato. For one other example I return to Eryximachus, who salvages something from a longwinded discourse with the clear-cut summary: "Whence I infer that in music, in medicine, in all other things human as well as divine both loves ought to be noted as far as may be, for they are both present."

Now in regard to speech composition we come to advice that pertains to Plato's favorite device for explaining and developing his ideas: comparison and contrast, Book ii, Chapter 3. Although Plato uses a great variety of rhetorical techniques in the *Symposium*, comparison and contrast are by far the most common. Here are some examples of contrast: Alcibiades says, "... but the purpose of the image will be truth, and not amusement." Aristophanes gives us the contrast between the fate of the man who alienates the gods and the bliss that comes when "... once we become friends with Eros, and made our peace with him." Phaedrus says, "... neither kindred, nor honour, nor wealth, nor any other motive is able to implant so well as love." Pausanias develops a section of his speech with a series of contrasts between the noble lover and the ignoble. Achilles and Pericles can be compared to others; says Alcibiades, but in contrast Socrates can be compared to no mortal. And other instances are to be found — some that clarify, some that emphasize, and some that function as logical argument.

As for comparison, instances are many and varied. Some are logical argument. Eryximachus says: "...

and as Pausanias was just now saying that to indulge good men is honourable, and bad men dishonourable: — so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the bad elements and the elements of disease are not to be indulged." Diotima follows the sound practice of arguing from the concrete to the abstract. After talking about bodily changes from youth to old age though the individual continues to bear the same name, she says, "And that is true not merely of the body, but also of the soul; true of our ways, our character, our notions, longings, pleasures, pains, and fears; not one of these remains the same in any individual, but some of them are being born while others are passing away." Similarly Alcibiades attempts to clarify his pain at being bitten by Socrates' philosophic discourses to the pain of anybody bitten by an adder. I counted no less than eight uses of comparison in the speech of Alcibiades — some for clarification, some for amplification, some for emphasis, and some serving more than one purpose: Socrates, Alcibiades reports, affects him much more strongly than do Pericles and other able orators.

Also in the family of comparison is analogy. Diotima uses this device as part of her definition of Love. Pausanias uses analogy as argument: "Take, for example, that which we are now doing, drinking, singing, and talking — these actions are not in themselves either good or evil, but they turn out in this way according to the mode of performing them; . . . and in like manner not every love, but only that which has a noble purpose, is noble and worthy of praise."

Finally in this consideration of contrast and comparison is an example of the *topos* of opposites. Agathon reasons, " . . . obviously the love of beauty, for eros is not based on ugliness."

But comparison and contrast are not Plato's only devices. As further advice in a make-belief handbook, Chapter 4, he would have said, "Use whatever device will foster the presentation of truth." Plato's speakers in the *Symposium* use almost every rhetorical device that can be imagined — instances of the use of witness and authorities, of intensifying devices, of achieving unity through using the same allusion in the conclusion as in the introduction, of argument by residue, of historical allusion, of the extended narrative, of the concrete and the specific, of vivid description; of the hypothetical example, of hypothetical conversation, of a digression for the sake of audience adaptation, of the axiom, of using snatches of verse for embellishment, of invented dialogue, of artistic ethos, of promising to take an oath, of personal testimony, and of narrative examples. These last two are major devices in the speech by Alcibiades.

Finally, in regard to Plato's ideas on invention, we find from a study of the speeches in the *Symposium* that he gave *logos* a high place. Enthymemes are frequent; thus, Plato, like Aristotle, stresses in his rhetoric the importance of deductive reasoning directed at

the beliefs and values of his listeners. True enough, the speeches are uneven in the use of enthymemes, but overall this means of invention is important. The speeches of Phaedrus and Agathon are especially rich in the use of this device, and Aristophanes has some interesting examples in his introduction. Here are some quick examples: Phaedrus utilizes the belief that the first and the eldest is the best as the basis for his argument that Eros is best among the gods.

Another example from the speech of Phaedrus: Love, he argues, is praiseworthy because it is a force for honour and bravery. Expanded into a syllogism, this argument begins, "Whatever is a force for honour and bravery is praiseworthy." The use of a common belief as the basis for the enthymeme is clear. Still another example: Aristophanes uses the common belief that temples are erected when the power of gods is recognized as the basis for proof through negation that the power of Eros is unappreciated. Just afterwards Aristophanes argues from the premise that healing brings the greatest happiness to mankind to the conclusion that Eros, who is a healer of ills, is man's greatest friend. And there are many others of these.

Proof by example, also, is common. Phaedrus offers Alcestis and Achilles as examples of heroism, and the case of Achilles and Patroclus as an example of the love of man for man.

In summary, enthymemes and examples appear too often and too artfully for their use to be accidental. Plato clearly believed that they had major roles to play in invention.

With this I complete the second section of this speech. From the *Symposium*, I conclude, we can learn much about Plato's ideas on rhetorical precepts and practices. Now for my third and final section: What did Plato regard as the ideal speech? Here I think we are to identify the great contribution that the *Symposium* makes to rhetoric. The *Phaedrus*, I shall argue, does not give us a good example of Plato's ideal speech, whereas the *Symposium* does perform this function. Plato, Everett Lee Hunt, your speaker a year ago, tells us, believed that dialogue is superior to continuous discourse. The second speech by Socrates in the *Phaedrus* is a continuous discourse, and though it is philosophic truth, it does not illustrate the value of dialogue. As Oscar Brownstein notes in the *Quarterly Journal*, " . . . the third speech has the limitations of any continuous discourse — it cannot be perfected by cross-examination." It is in the *Symposium* that Plato's rules for good speaking are fully illustrated. So let us give our attention to the speech of Socrates, much of which is cast in the form of a speech by Diotima.

Socrates begins his turn by examining Agathon dialectically for the purpose of exposing the falsity of the preceding address and for the further purpose of showing the true nature of Eros. After that he explains that he will use for his speech the remarks that he

once heard from Diotima. She begins with definition, a quality of speechmaking that Socrates insisted on in the *Phaedrus* also. It is not definition in the sense of a one-sentence statement, but definition in the form of an extended analysis and description. Diotima answers the question "What function has Eros?" and explains his parents and origin. Then after an internal summary, she answers operationally the question "What value has Eros for mankind?" Diotima finishes with an uninterrupted passage of about 2,000 words in translation. At this point we find specific evidence that Plato associated continuous discourse with sophistic rhetoric and a dialectic presentation with true rhetoric. Socrates comments as he introduces this longest monologue within his whole contribution, "And she, replying like a finished Sophist." After that Socrates gives instruction on how to acquire the benefits of Love. The speech then reaches a climax that unifies the preceding ideas. This passage is one of poetic beauty and it is the culmination of the philosophic inquiry. At the end is a conclusion of about 200 words that applies to the audience specifically the thoughts emphasized in the climax.

The Socrates-Diotima address is admirable in many ways. It is clear, pointed, inventive, well arranged, and beautifully poetic. But, more important, Plato illustrates not only the *presentation* of truth but also the *development* of truth through dialectic inquiry. The content of this speech is largely dialectic. Socrates in his conversation with Diotima uses the dialectic process by which truth is found about Love. The ideal speech becomes a combination of rhetoric, poetic, and dialectic — rhetoric in purpose, dialectic in content, and poetic in expression. A second quality of this presentation is that it is highly conversational — in many ways a nonspeech. Rhetorical devices can be found, but they are kept inconspicuous. Although the sophisticated rhetorical analyst has no difficulty in identifying strategies and devices in abundance, to the ordinary reader these surely must be unobtrusive. The devices are subordinate to the ideas — they clarify and heighten ideas; they are not used for their own sake. Unlike in sophistic rhetoric, the functions of devices are not those of conforming to rules or displaying the speaker's virtuosity. Finally, in the climax Plato gives us rhetoric at its finest: the philosopher-speaker is stating the truth, reached dialectically, with poetic beauty and without outward signs of artifice.

What was Plato's ideal rhetoric, then? It was a presentation of dialectic inquiry reaching truth; it was a conversational, nonspeech whose rhetorical devices were unobtrusive. It brought dialectic, poetic, and rhetoric together. It did not abstain from rhetorical techniques, but it used them to present truth and not for ostentatious display. Whether Plato would call this type of discourse "rhetoric" can be questioned. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper, and

frankly whether his label for such a presentation would be "speech" or "dialectic conversation" or something else and whether he would classify the presentation as "rhetoric" or "dialectic" do not interest me very much. The purpose was rhetorical and rhetorical devices are plentiful.

In closing, I shall make no attempt to summarize fully the preceding remarks. The *Symposium* is a charming dialogue, whose importance to rhetoric has been largely overlooked. In it Plato confirms much that he does and states in the *Phaedrus*. There is further evidence that Plato not only was a master of rhetorical techniques but also that he appreciated their contributions to oral discourse, though insisting that whether the orator knew the truth was the critical test for rhetorical excellence. In combining dialectic with rhetorical purpose in the Socrates-Diotima speech, Plato went beyond the *Phaedrus* in recording an example of the rhetoric that he approved. To me the *Symposium* removes whatever doubt there has been about whether Plato opposed all rhetoric. I think very clearly that he did not.

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THE RHETORIC OF THE FIRST GRADE READER

by
Virginia Kidd

Graduate in Speech Communication, Sacramento State College

In the fall of 1969, 369,444 students were enrolled in the first grade in the California public schools.¹ They were ostensibly taught to read, write, do arithmetic, skip as many as two bars at a time on the playground equipment, and engage in a variety of miscellaneous activities.

In addition, they were quietly and without much notice taught something of a different nature. "Our moral precepts and practices are made an integral part of the school curriculum," wrote Nathaniel Hickerson in his book *Education for Alienation*. He advanced the concept that education is merely an instrument of the society, disseminating cultural mores as well as the three R's.²

Arthur Allen, writing in *The National Elementary Principal*, cited one method these moral precepts are taught: "We can reasonably conclude that children's books of every era play a vital role in communicating attitudes and cultural values."³

When over 300,000 students per year are being advanced a particular view of society's values, it seems important to determine exactly what values are being advanced. To this end, I wish to examine the mainstay of a child's introductory schooling - the inevitable first grade reader, certainly in terms of audience reached, a formidable piece of rhetoric.

This paper will not deal with the acquisition of reading skill. Rather, it will investigate the rhetoric of the texts to determine (1) what values are advanced, (2) what rhetorical methods are used to support the values, (3) what the probable rhetorical effects are, and (4) what evaluations can be made of the rhetoric.

In 1969, California adopted a new line of textbooks for use throughout the state for four to eight years.⁴ The major line of first grade texts is the Harper and Row

Basic Reading Program. This paper will examine those first grade readers from this series designed for use in "usual" classrooms.⁵

The first observation to be made about the Harper and Row readers is something we all had realized years ago about Dick and Jane and Baby Sally: namely, they advance relentlessly with us. That is, the first book is about Janet and Mark. The second book is about Janet and Mark. The third book is about Janet and Mark. Janet and Mark and their ever-patient Mother and Daddy become the first grader's everyman. There are no alternatives. There is only one world - the world of Janet and Mark. Eventually it becomes simply The World. Official and in print, year after year, Mark and Janet march on bearing the standard that is World Without End. Amen.

Though there are many values advanced in this recurring world, there seem to be three major value systems: Janet and Mark live in an antiseptic world; Janet and Mark know the social roles they should play in this world; Janet and Mark know the economic role they should play. A more detailed analysis of these systems indicates the rhetoric.

In looking at the world portrayed in the first grade reader, one aspect is immediately obvious: there are no extremes in this world. The rhetoric is clear: a bland world is a good world. The world includes no deviances; the attitudes of all characters are uniform. Events that occur in the books do not provoke criticism. Disagreement arises when we realize that the same kinds of events occur regularly to the exclusion of all possible variations. This sort of homogeneity seems to suggest that such variations are in fact undesirable.

Janet and Mark live in a plain house in a plain suburb.⁶ They go to the playground,⁷ they go on a picnic,⁸

¹Department of Administrative Research, California State Department of Education.

²Nathaniel Hickerson, *Education for Alienation* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 42.

³Arthur Allen, "Micro-boppers, Life Styles and Books," *The National Elementary Principal*, 49 (November, 1969), pp. 26-9.

⁴*Elementary School Textbooks Adopted by the State Board of Education for Use in California during 1969-70* (Sacramento: California State Department of Education, July, 1969), p. 2.

⁵The books in this series are the following: the first preprimer, *Janet and Mark*; the second preprimer, *Outdoors and In*; the third preprimer, *City Days, City Ways*; the fourth preprimer, *Just for Fun*; and the primer, *Around the Corner*. There are special texts designed for the disadvantaged and for special readers, but this paper will not deal with these.

⁶Mabel O'Donnell, *City Days, City Ways* (Sacramento: California State Department of Education, 1969), p. 5. Since author and publisher are the same for all primers, future references will be by title and page only.

⁷*Janet and Mark*, p. 6.

⁸*Outdoors and In*, pp. 2-12.

they visit grandma,⁹ they own a dog.¹⁰ They buy shoes in a building conveniently named "Shoe Store,"¹¹ and they give to the Red Cross.¹² Mother wears clothing of another era. She still wears gloves to town¹³ and a dress on a picnic.¹⁴ (On one risqué occasion she does don knee-length shorts.¹⁵ While it could be noted that she was at a swimming pool at that time, still we might generally agree that it represents an improvement over the skirt and blouse she wore in the speedboat.)¹⁶

In keeping with modern trends, Janet and Mark have friends of different races. Negro children are easily recognizable on the playground.¹⁷ Mark's friend David is clearly dark.¹⁸ But Janet still cheers the cowboy over the Indian, and it becomes evident that face colors could be changed indiscriminately without affecting the stories.¹⁹

The difficulty with this description of a world lies in the omissions. Janet and Mark do not talk about school, paint pictures, take music lessons, write verse, or wonder about God. There are no crises in their world; their parents do not divorce, their grandmother does not move in, they do not wear glasses, their dog never gets pregnant, they're never embarrassed or ashamed.

They learn this from their parents, who never quarrel, espouse political ideals, engage in artistic activities, hire baby sitters, get sick, display mutual affection, or — most tragic of all — speak to one another. In 410 pages, Daddy and Mother say only two lines to one another: "I want a speedboat ride, Daddy,"²⁰ and "Look in the box, Mother."²¹

The transcendence of Mark and Janet's world from alternative to prescriptive is accented by the language of the reader. This is demonstrated clearly in Mother's speech when she talks of Mark's birthday party: "This is what he wants . . . this is what all boys want."²² And again, when she described the food of the party: "Just what all boys like! Just what all boys want!"²³

⁹City Days, City Ways, pp. 64-71.

¹⁰Janet and Mark, p. 24.

¹¹City Days, City Ways, p. 19.

¹²Around the Corner, pp. 147-157.

¹³City Ways, City Days, pp. 30-23.

¹⁴Outdoors and In, pp. 2-12.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 58-62.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 52-66.

¹⁷Janet and Mark, pp. 6-11.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 25-28.

²⁰Outdoors and In, p. 52.

²¹Ibid., p. 69.

²²Around the Corner, p. 141.

²³Ibid., p. 143.

The constant underlying implication that this is the only world, for all people, is the frightening potential of this rhetoric.

Within the limits of this antiseptic world, the characters play clearly prescribed roles. Mother's chief occupation in life, it is clear from the pictures, is washing dishes, cooking, sewing, ironing, and wearing aprons. (There are 18 stories featuring women in the home; the woman wears an apron in 12 of them.)²⁴ Daddy's chief occupation is coming home. Daddy is never seen wiping away Janet's tears or helping Mark clean his room; he plays ball with Mark.²⁵ Mother never goes to work or drives the car; she helps Janet make a cake.²⁶

Janet and Mark continue this dramatization of sexual roles. The story of Janet's new skates illustrates the point clearly: Janet tries on the skates and falls.

"Mark! Janet!" said Mother.

"What is going on here?"

"She cannot skate," said Mark.

"I can help her.

I want to help her.

Look at her, Mother.

Just look at her.

She is just like a girl.

She gives up."

Mother forces Janet to try again.

"Now you see," said Mark.

"Now you can skate.

But just with me to help you."²⁷

The indoctrination of Janet, and through her the children of California, is clear. It is more firmly embedded by the fact that Janet never makes a similar comment to Mark.

Companion stories, featuring each child separately, continue the same viewpoint. Mark shows Janet his toys: parachute, rocket, space suit, helmet, gloves, and boots. He declares himself Mark, the astronaut.²⁸ Then it is Janet's turn. She shows her toys: playhouse, chairs, curtains, dolls, buggy, doll bed, dishes.²⁹

Within the text a "Just for Fun" section features animal stories. The text is careful, even here, to follow the same value trends. Mother no longer looks like Jane Wyatt on *Father Knows Best*. Now she is clearly a bear. But she is still wearing an apron and still drying dishes.³⁰ Little Bear, given the pronoun "he," is a jolly sort, who spends "his" story looking for fun.³¹ Little Frog, given the pronoun "she," sits on a rock

²⁴This pattern is consistent in all five of the books studied.

²⁵Around the Corner, p. 80.

²⁶Outdoors and In, pp. 39-44.

²⁷Around the Corner, pp. 45-46.

²⁸Janet and Mark, pp. 37-42.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 43-47.

³⁰Around the Corner, p. 83.

³¹Ibid., pp. 83-93.

asking people what to do.³²

Society has varying views on the appropriate behavior of males and females. Certainly there are those who would accept the tradition of Janet running from Mark's grass snake.³³ The criticism is with the lack of choice. Janet is never a potential artist, senator, scientist. Mark never represents the actor, professor, gourmet. And Janet and Mark, like death and taxes, are with us always, and always they act the same confining parts.

Role playing is demonstrated not only in the social world, but also in the economic world. Janet and Mark are inveterate consumers. American business would be proud of them. The value of acquiring objects is illustrated in each of the preprimers, but it is the primer *Around the Corner*, that most exactly demonstrates the value.

On page 29, Janet and Mark find a dime and reach one of the emotional climaxes of the book by quarreling over it. Mother, rather than reprimanding them, divides, giving each a nickel. Janet's instant comment is: "Now we can get something." They leave immediately.³⁴

On page 41, Mrs. Long brings skates for Janet. Mark's first observation is, "What do I get?"³⁵

On page 67 Janet expresses a desire to do something exciting. Mother's solution is to buy T shirts and earrings.³⁶

The consumer model reaches its height on page 75 when Mark finds a pigeon. His friend David offers to buy it.

"Will you give him to me?"

Will you give him to me for a nickel?"

Mark could conceivably give several alternative replies at this point: you may have this pigeon as a gift; you may have the pigeon if you will care for it; we must let the pigeon go free, etc. Each would teach a different value. The reply chosen illustrates the actual viewpoint expressed in the book:

"For a nickel!" said Mark.

"What good is a nickel? . . .

You can have my pigeon for a dime."³⁷

Notice that Mark is not selfish. Rather, both Mark and David are functional operatives in a consumer society.

Janet's role as a consumer is similar. "I'm going to have a birthday," she says, "You can get something for me." Daddy's reply?

"Good for you," said Daddy

"Look out for yourself, Janet."³⁸

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 103 - 109.

³³ *Around the Corner*, pp. 21 - 22.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

These three value systems - a bland, uniform world, confined social roles, and a consumer orientation - are continually advanced in the first grade readers. The next question of concern is what rhetorical methods are used for support of these values.

In his master's thesis, Gunnar Aarrestad defined persuasive efforts in language textbooks as the attempt . . . to modify behavior, attitudes, or values through the manipulation of symbols and individual desires without the conscious knowledge or awareness of the person being manipulated.³⁹

The key phrase here is "without the conscious awareness of the person being manipulated." The values presented in the first grade readers are presented in such a fashion, to persons concentrating on the meaning of words and the study of a skill, not the value patterns in the context.

Roger Brown, in his book *Social Psychology*, points out that persons learn behavior patterns by imitation. He further mentions that these patterns can be learned by observation alone and need not be experienced by the persons involved.⁴⁰

Here is the key to the rhetorical style of the readers. The children learn by imitation, yet are given but one model to imitate. Certainly the readers are not the only books to which the children are exposed, nor is the teacher without influence in their reaction to the material. Still, the children are not questioning or refuting the material. They are in a school setting, where acceptance of textbook content is a definite virtue. No one questions the statements in the math book; no one denies the descriptions in the science text; in a like manner, Janet and Mark are very likely to be accepted as appropriate models.

Dr. Edward Hall, in *The Silent Language*, summarized this kind of persuasion:

The principal agent is a model used for imitation. Whole clusters of related activities are learned at a time, in many cases without the knowledge that they are being learned at all.⁴¹

The persuasion is furthered in this instance by lack of a strong defense against such rhetoric on the part of young children. Piaget, in his studies of the thought processes of children, marks the ages of seven or eight as the beginning of what we term logical thought.⁴² A logical defensive response to the imitation model would seem to call for more astuteness than can reasonably be expected for an average six year old.

³⁹ Gunnar Aarrestad, "An Analysis of Apparent Psychological Persuasion in an Audio-Lingual Foreign Language Textbook Series" (unpublished master's thesis, Sacramento State College, 1968), p. 8.

⁴⁰ Roger Brown, *Social Psychology* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 394 - 401.

⁴¹ Edward Hall, *The Silent Language* (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1959), p. 70.

⁴² Jean Piaget, *Six Psychological Studies* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 41.

Empirical studies of reading and its effects on children's attitudes indicate a relationship between the two. Jackson showed that reading just one story affected temporary attitude toward Negroes.⁴³ Webster demonstrated that reductions in fear of the dark and of dogs could be accomplished by reading.⁴⁴ Tauran studied attitudes toward Eskimos, and indicated that attitudes of children were influenced either positively or negatively depending upon the type of materials read.⁴⁵

Though no studies have been conducted specifically on the Mark and Janet readers and their audience, we can make certain speculations as to the effects of continuous exposure to such material. Traditionally, analysis breaks down audiences into three groups – the neutral, the committed, the opposed. Upon such audiences certain results are highly probable.

Children with no strongly developed values in the areas taught in the books have no reason to reject the material. The ideas are approved by those whom the children approve; they are presented not as arguments but as accepted mores. Without reason for objection to the values, the children would be very likely simply to accept them.

Upon children who already accept the values expressed in the first grade readers, the persuasive effect would be that of reinforcement. The books verify their world; what they observe and what they read coincide. The persuasion strengthens their beliefs.

The most complex reaction to the rhetoric would appear to lie with children whose family life styles are unlike the world of Janet and Mark. While we cannot specify the exact response of such children, it is safe to presume such repetition and exposure to situations contrary to their real world would produce conflicts within the children.

There is every reason to believe the rhetoric of the first grade reader is effective in persuading its audiences. While we cannot explicitly ascertain the direct intent of the authors of this work, we can examine the work itself, see the overt persuasive appeal of it, and reason that upon young children who have not fully developed reasoning processes, who are patterned to learn by imitation, who are presented material by trusted authority-figures and who spend a great deal of time on the material, the rhetoric would be highly persuasive.

Given such an effect, the next question to be considered must be, is this desirable? Since it seems

impossible to present valueless reading matter, what should be the legitimate values presented in a first grade text? Conceivably there could be as many answers to this question as hearers of it. As a beginning, however, let us take the answer of the same agency responsible for the texts – the California State Department of Education:

Individual differences should be appreciated rather than merely tolerated . . . It is because of them that individuals are able to make contributions to society.⁴⁶

It seems highly unlikely that such individual differences would be fostered by the presentation of a single view of society. A much more stimulating approach is suggested by Dr. Arthur Allen:

The vast differences in range and depth of interests in a society where cultural pluralism is characteristic demand that children's books should take into account the reading interests of broader, more representative groups – groups that cross socio-economic, cultural and grade levels.⁴⁷

In a pluralistic society which holds individualism as a basic national tenet, it is important to be aware of the dangers presented by rhetoric supporting cultural uniformity. It is only appropriate that the most harsh warning should be embedded in the rhetoric of the text itself. Laid out clearly, for all to see, is the deadly implication of the rhetoric of the first grade reader:

"What can I be, Mother?" said Little Lamb.
"I want to be something new."

"What can you be?" said her mother.
"Someday you will be a sheep.
A sheep . . . just like me."

Little Lamb ran up and down
in the green meadow.
Little Lamb was happy.⁴⁸

⁴³E.P. Jackson, "Effects of Reading Upon Attitudes Toward the Negro Race," *Library Quarterly*, 14 (1944), pp. 47-54.

⁴⁴J. Webster, "Using Books to Reduce the Fears of First Grade Children," *The Reading Teacher*, 14 (1961), pp. 159-162.

⁴⁵R.H. Tauran, "The influence of Reading on the Attitudes of Third Graders Toward Eskimos." (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland, 1967).

⁴⁶*Teachers Guide to Education in Early Childhood* (Sacramento: California State Department of Education, 1956), p. 2.

⁴⁷Allen, "Micro-Boppers," p. 28.

⁴⁸*Around the Corner*, pp. 101-102.

SYMBOLISM, NARRATIVE, HISTORY: RHETORICAL PLANES IN THE OCTOPUS

by

Patricia Logue

Senior in Rhetoric, University of California, Davis

When Frank Norris' novel *The Octopus* was published, reviewers immediately recognized the book's persuasive impact.¹ One critic predicted that this story of a struggle between California wheat farmers and the railroad monopoly would "awaken people from the death-dealing slumber that has been brought about by the multitudinous influences of corporate greed, controlling government and the opinion-forming agencies of the Republic."² No less a figure than Teddy Roosevelt mentioned *The Octopus* as one of the factors shaping his opinion of the railroads.³ Classed with such exposes as Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle* and Lincoln Steffens' *The Shame of the Cities*,⁴ Norris' work fits squarely into the Muckraking tradition as Richard Hofstadter describes it:

First reality must in its fulness be exposed, and then it must be made the subject of moral exhortation; and then, when individual citizens in sufficient numbers had stiffened in their determination to effect reform, something could be done.⁵

To the modern reader, the urgency for reform may be somewhat diminished, but the book is good literature and still makes enjoyable reading. Because of its contemporary impact as a piece of Muckraking literature and the insight it provides into that movement, *The Octopus* should interest the rhetorical critic. Even more interesting is an examination of the book to determine what it reveals about Norris' own rhetoric. The method he employs to build his case against the railroad can be analysed on three rhetorical planes: symbolic, narrative, and historical.

The first installment of an intended trilogy on the production, distribution, and consumption of wheat, *The Octopus* tells the story of the wheat farmers in California's San Joaquin Valley and of their unsuccessful fight to save their land from confiscation by the railroad. The

very title launches the reader into the symbolic plane. The octopus is the symbol of the railroad, with "tentacles of steel clutching into the soil."⁶ The imagery is highly affective. Even a map of the fictional Pacific and Southwest Railroad resembles an octopus, with all the lines radiating from the central point at San Francisco. Drawn upon a white background, "the red arteries of the monster stood out, swollen with life-blood, reaching out to infinity, gorged to bursting; an excrescence, a gigantic parasite fattening upon the life-blood of an entire commonwealth."⁷ Throughout the story the railroad is pictured as an evil creature, unexpectedly rising from dark depths to capture and crush an innocent victim in one of its infinite appendages.

Another symbolic indictment of the railroad is Norris' use of helpless animals to represent the human beings victimized by the monopoly. At the beginning of the novel, a flock of sheep wanders on to the train tracks just as an engine roars by. The character witnessing this incident is horror-stricken by the slaughter, "a massacre of innocents . . . To the right and left, all the width of the right of way, the little bodies had been flung; backs were snapped against fence posts; brains knocked out."⁸ Immediately preceeding the climax of the book, when five of the ranchers are killed, a rabbit round-up is held, in which the animals are driven into a pen and beaten to death, "blindly, furiously."⁹

The characters in the book also function symbolically. In offering social commentary, Norris believed his characters should represent personality types. He wrote that "the social tendencies must be expressed by means of analysis of the characters of the men and women who compose that society."¹⁰ For this reason, many of the characters in *The Octopus* are stereotypes, and even those who emerge as distinct individuals tend to be portrayed in black-and-white terms, depending upon their relationship to the railroad. The same distasteful characteristics of the malevolent S. Behrman, local agent of

¹See especially B.O. Flower: "The Trust in Fiction: A Remarkable Social Novel," *The Arena*²⁷ (May, 1902), 547-54 and William Morton Payne: "Recent Fiction," *The Dial* 31 (September, 1901) 136.

²Flower, p. 554.

³Irving McKee: "Notable Memorials to Mussel Slough," *Pacific Historical Review* XII (February, 1948) 26.

⁴Richard Hofstadter: *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1955) p. 201.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁶Frank Norris: *The Octopus* (New York, 1958), p. 33.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 336.

¹⁰Franklin Walker: *Frank Norris, A Biography* (Garden City, 1932), p. 258.

the Pacific and Southwest, are mentioned every time he appears in the novel. He is "fat, with a vast stomach, the ch and neck meeting to form a great, tremulous jowl, a roll of fat over his collar, sprinkled with sparse, stiff hairs . . . the heavy watch chain clinking against the pearl vest buttons . . . placid, unruffled, never losing his temper, serene, unassailable, enthroned."¹¹ Genslinger, editor of the railroad-controlled *Bonneville Mercury*, "speaks with great rapidity and with nervous, abrupt gestures." He is a "brown, dry, lean little man. Exact dates are his delight."¹² Shelgrim, omnipotent president of the railroad, possesses "an ogre's vitality . . . sucked from the life-blood of an entire people."¹³

While the characters associated with the railroad are all manifestations of evil, those opposed to the Pacific and Southwest are symbols of goodness and purity. "Governor" Magnus Derrick, head of a farmers' organization formed to fight the railroad, is always "erect," imposing, commanding respect wherever he goes. Hilma Tree is "hale, honest, radiant . . . the embodiment of day."¹⁴ Dyke is slow and good-natured, always referring to his daughter as "the little tad."

In addition to symbolizing good and evil, the characters in *The Octopus* also function as tools in Norris' second rhetorical plane, that of the action in the story. Norris' technique in his narrative is to cause these symbols of goodness to suffer horribly on account of the railroad. The indictment is plain. No grief imaginable seems to be escaped, the railroad apparently leaving no source of exploitation unexploited. At times the effect becomes rather bathetic, but an enumeration of some of the tragic episodes is necessary to illustrate their function in shaping the attitude of the reader.

In his fight against the Pacific and Southwest, Magnus Derrick compromises his lifelong political principles, sees one of his sons bribed by the railroad and the other killed by one of its agents, loses his ranch, and finally goes insane. Dyke, jovial engineer, is fired from his job on the railroad and goes into hop farming, only to be financially ruined by a sudden increase in hauling rates. Angered, he becomes a train robber and murderer, to the anguish and shame of his mother and daughter, who are left without means of support. When Hoovan, an immigrant farmhand on Derrick's ranch, is killed in a gun battle against the railroad's agents, his wife and two daughters are forced to try their luck in San Francisco. Minna, the elder daughter, becomes separated from her mother and sister and turns to

prostitution to support herself. In a scene which has been called both the most artistic and the most ridiculous of the book,¹⁵ Mrs. Hoovan starves to death a few steps from the door of one of the vice-presidents of the railroad. Mercifully for the reader, these tragedies are spaced throughout the book, so that one does not have to endure the ludicrously overdramatic effect of seeing them all at once. The fact remains, however, that only one railroad character comes to any harm in the book, and his downfall is ascribed to the vast forces of nature rather than to opponents of the railroad.

Norris' characters are the convenient vehicle by which he unifies the symbolic and narrative rhetorical planes. All the characters who are symbolically good are also anti-railroad. Characters connected with the Pacific and Southwest are evil, thereby arousing the reader's sympathy for the ranchers and against the monopoly. These sympathies are reinforced in the narrative plane: the good figures are plagued by tragedy; the evil figures, prospering at the expense of the poor and innocent, escape unpunished.

The characters also take the reader into the third rhetorical plane of the novel. At this level Norris utilizes historical events as a device for influencing opinion about the railroad. While the characters are useful symbolically and in the narrative, they are modeled after people who actually lived the events in the story.¹⁶ The powerful Shelgrim bears more than a coincidental resemblance to Collis P. Huntington, the financial and political mastermind behind the Southern Pacific Railroad. Norris managed to interview Huntington as part of his preparation for the novel,¹⁷ so the resemblance is not particularly surprising. The physical similarities between the two are most striking, even down to the detail of both men wearing skullcaps while they worked.¹⁸ The portrait is made even more convincing when Shelgrim justifies his railroad's activities with exactly the arguments Leland Stanford had publically articulated over the years.¹⁹

Nor are the railroad supporters the only characters having historical counterparts. "Governor" Magnus Derrick is modeled after a Major McQuiddy, the president of the farmers' organization formed to fight the railroad. Delaney, a ranchhand who turns gunfighter, parallels Walter Crow, a sharpshooter believed responsible for the deaths of several figures prominent in the railroad

¹⁵Cf. Ernest Marchand: *Frank Norris, A Study* (Stanford, 1942), pp. 157-60, Donald Pizer: *The Novels of Frank Norris* (Bloomington, 1966), p. 158, and Warren Franch: *Frank Norris* (New York, 1962), pp. 102-3.

¹⁶McKee, p. 25.

¹⁷Pizer, p. 124.

¹⁸Cf. the description of C. P. Huntington in Oscar Lewis: *The Big Four* (New York, 1938), pp. 217-19 and the description of Shelgrim in Norris, p. 383.

¹⁹Pizer, p. 143 and unnumbered note. Also note on p. 137.

¹¹Norris, p. 140.

¹²Lars Ahnebrink: *The Beginnings of Naturalism in American Fiction* (New York, 1961), p. 464. This volume contains the first publication of the character sketches Norris wrote for *The Octopus*.

¹³Norris, p. 382.

¹⁴Ahnebrink, p. 462.

controversy. The story of Dyke is very close to that of Chris Evans, a train robber captured in 1893.²⁰ Even the symbolic use of the octopus to represent the railroad was familiar to Norris' readers, since political cartoonists of the day had so pictured the monolithic nature of the organization.²¹

Besides the historical significance of Norris' characters, another persuasive device employed is the use of events which actually took place during the last quarter of the nineteenth century as the backbone of the novel's plot.²² The fictional Pacific and Southwest Railroad represents the Southern Pacific, which was involved in a land struggle during the 1870's and 1880's.

To induce people to settle along railroad lines, the Southern Pacific offered ranchers the opportunity to farm on railroad property along the lines, leading the farmers to believe that they would receive the first option to buy the land once it was formally appraised and offered for sale. When the land was finally put up for sale several years after the ranchers had started producing wheat, they discovered that the selling price was not based upon the condition of the land at the time they had occupied it, but rather upon the condition of the land as it had been improved by the ranchers. A series of long court cases and appeals ensued, with the farmers eventually losing. The struggle culminated in the famous "battle" of Mussel Slough on May 11, 1880. Since the farmers had refused to pay the railroad's price for the land, a Federal marshal and posse were dispatched to evict the ranchers. For an undetermined reason a gun battle began, ending with the deaths of five of the ranchers and two posse members. The memory of the incident was long kept alive by foes of the railroad as an example of Southern Pacific's tyranny over the people of California.²³ After spending several months investigating this incident, Norris decided to use it as the climax of his book.

As a rhetorical choice, Norris' decision to use this particular event as the critical incident in the novel is an excellent one. Since Mussel Slough had received a previous fictional treatment²⁴ and was mentioned constantly by foes of the railroad, the memory of the "massacre" still caused public resentment as late as 1901, when the book was published. Writing at the beginning of the Muckraking movement, the author capitalizes on the discontent which Americans felt towards big business in general and the railroads in particular. Cleverly, Norris includes enough detail in

the novel for his readers to recognize that his fictional characters and incidents closely resemble real people and actual events. In terms of plot structure, the incident unifies the three rhetorical planes of the novel by consummating the triumph of the railroad and the downfall of the farmers.

Although Norris uses symbolism, narrative, and history in his attempt to create an antagonistic attitude toward the railroad, the author was not so naive as to believe that all the social problems of his day could be attributed to the railroads or to trusts in general. Rather than propose a panacea for all the evils he observes, Norris exposes his readers to the enormous complexity of the situation. The blame for the downfall of all the good characters appears to be placed upon the railroad, but Shelgrim presents the railroad's point of view in this manner:

... you are dealing with forces, young man, when you speak of wheat and the Railroads, not with men The Wheat is one force, the Railroad, another, and there is a law that governs them — supply and demand. Men have only a little to do with the whole business Control the Road! Can I stop it? I can go into bankruptcy if you like. But otherwise if I run my road, as a business proposition, I can do nothing It is a force born out of certain conditions, and I — no man — can stop or control it.²⁵

While some critics have interpreted this passage to mean that Norris is trying to absolve the railroad of blame for the tragedies in the story,²⁶ the rest of the book and public reaction when it was released belie this interpretation. Rather, Norris reveals the extent of the problem to show that it will not be solved easily. In this respect he typifies the Muckraker's desire to expose and arouse public indignation over social problems. As an example of Muckraking literature, the book is of interest to the rhetorical critic. Because of its literary merit, *The Octopus* has survived the period of its immediate social impact, allowing the modern reader to see how one novelist employs rhetorical devices to build his fictional case. While the power of a railroad monopoly seems an insignificant worry today, Norris' novel is still exciting reading:

Then faint, prolonged, across the levels of the ranch, he heard the engine whistle for Bonneville. Again and again, at rapid intervals in its flying course, it whistled for road crossings, for sharp curves, for trestles; ominous notes, hoarse, bellowing, ringing with the accents of menace and defiance; and abruptly Presley saw again, in his imagination, the galloping monster, the terror of steel and steam, with its single eye, Cyclopean, red, shooting from horizon to

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 125 and McKee, p. 25.

²¹See the cartoons reprinted in Lewis, facing pp. 292-3.

²²The best historical background of these events available is the McKee article.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁴Josiah Royce: *The Feud of Oakfield Creek: A Novel of California Life* (1887).

²⁵Norris, p. 33.

²⁶French, p. 101 and Marchand, p. 155.

horizon; but saw it now as the symbol of a vast power, huge, terrible, flinging the echo of its thunder over all the reaches of the valley, leaving blood and destruction in its path; the leviathan, with tentacles of steel clutching into the soil, the soulless Force, the iron-hearted Power, the monster, the Colossus, the Octopus.²⁷

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: ICONOCLASM IN COMMUNICATION

by
Gale Schroeder

Graduate in Speech, University of California, Los Angeles

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The study of communication demands an investigation of the practice of communication, as well as an inquiry into the philosophical bases of speech communication. The relationship between philosophy and practice is such that one implies the other, for theories can only be derived from an investigation of practice, while, in turn, theories modify practice. Fundamental to the philosophy of communication is a study of man's perception of reality, for the nature of his perception necessarily influences his communication with others. This paper discusses Arthur Schopenhauer's views as they relate to the theory and practice of communication today, and examines how his perception of reality influences his philosophy of speech communication.

The study of a philosopher's views and their application to the field of speech is not new, but there has been little research done in the area.¹ Even so, Schopenhauer is not a new name to the field of speech. In 1917, James Albert Winans, mentioned Schopenhauer in reference to effective delivery;² and in 1918 Charles Woolbert credits Schopenhauer for his understanding of the "unconscious judgment."³

Among contemporary scholars in speech communication, James McBurney and Kenneth G. Hance give an excellent pithy discussion of Schopenhauer's stratagems,⁴ while Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer acknowledge Schopenhauer's work on stratagems.⁵

Although portions of Schopenhauer's thought have been used by writers in the field of speech, no system-

atic review of the applicability of his thought to communication has been made. To this end, this paper is directed. Accordingly, I will focus on 1) Schopenhauer's general philosophy; 2) his investigation of communication as revealed in his concept of the syllogism, rhetoric,⁶ and dialectic;⁷ and 3) the significance of Schopenhauer's philosophical insights for the field of speech communication today.

Arthur Schopenhauer, an early nineteenth century German philosopher, lived in an age of philosophical giants and refused to be a pygmy himself. While Kant pursued his Categorical Imperative and Hegel developed his abstract metaphysics, Schopenhauer perceived man as a victim of will and insisted that the Will – the human "will to live" – is the primal force in the world. Schopenhauer's philosophy is an attempt to answer the question: How does one get through a life not worth living? This question derives from the view that the Will is equated with desire, which produces only suffering, and is therefore evil. Schopenhauer's psychology of desire is grounded in Plato and in eastern philosophy, that to satisfy one desire only gives rise to another, and therefore, to satiate the will is an endless, fruitless course like " . . . forever trying to carry water in a sieve."⁸ Thus, Schopenhauer's pessimism is a result of the view that fundamentally, man cannot escape the Will, and is doomed to a life of suffering.

Despite the pessimistic speculation that it is better "not to be," some elements of optimism, probably of Eastern origin, can be discerned in his philosophy. He advances the conception of unity of the universe; that is, he sees in compassion, the identity of one's self with others. This identity allows one to share not only another's suffering, but also another's well-being and happiness.⁹ The principle of identity, or identification,

⁶Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, II (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1883), pp. 285-306.

⁷Arthur Schopenhauer, "The Art of Controversy," *The Pessimist's Handbook*, ed. Hazel E. Barnes and trans. T. Bailey Saunders, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), pp. 550-613.

⁸Hazel E. Barnes, "Schopenhauer, Evangelist of Pessimism," *The Pessimist's Handbook*, ed. Hazel E. Barnes (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), p. xvi.

⁹Richard Taylor, "Introduction," *On The Basis of Morality* by Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. E.F.J. Payne, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965) p. xxiii.

¹Three recent articles regarding a philosophy for rhetoric include: Robert T. Oliver, "The Rhetorical Implications of Taoism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XLVII (February, 1961), pp. 27-35.

Raymond E. Anderson, "Kierkegaard's Theory of Communication," *Speech Monographs*, XXX (March, 1963), pp. 1-14.
Donald L. Torrence, "A Philosophy for Rhetoric from Bertrand Russell," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* XLV (April, 1959), pp. 153-165.

²James Albert Winans, *Public Speaking*, (New York: The Century Co., 1917) pp. 47, 65.

³Charles H. Woolbert "The Place of Logic in a System of Persuasion," *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education*, IV (January 1918), p. 21.

⁴James H. McBurney and Kenneth G. Hance, "Obstacles to Reflective Thinking," *Discussion in Human Affairs*, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950) pp. 138-147.

⁵Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, *Discussion and Debate Tools of a Democracy*, (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, Inc., 1951)

is an important psychological concept in the persuasive theories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and plays a role in his theory of stratagems as well as his moral philosophy.

Schopenhauer develops his doctrine of communication by drawing ideas from many sources, as well as making original contributions of his own. For his interpretation of conventional philosophical problems, he has often been labeled an iconoclast.¹⁰ In the field of communication, Schopenhauer also rebels against classical theory, and offers alternatives currently explored in modern communication research.

Schopenhauer's main philosophical work lays the foundation of his communication theory.¹¹ He designates the proper boundaries of logic, dialectic, and rhetoric and incorporates these three traditional elements into the same conceptual sphere:

Logic, Dialectic, and Rhetoric go together, because they make up the whole of a *technic of reason*, and under this title they ought also to be taught — Logic as the technic of our thinking, Dialectic of disputing with others, and Rhetoric of speaking to many (*concionatio*); and thus corresponding to the singular, dual, and plural and to the monologue, the dialogue, and the panegyric.¹²

Schopenhauer's theory of logic maintains that although formal logic has great theoretical interest, it has little value for judging the validity of one's personal thought process, "For the errors of our own reasoning, scarcely ever lie in the inferences nor otherwise in the form, but in the judgments, thus in the matter of thought."¹³ Logic has little rhetorical significance because, according to Schopenhauer, man does not err in his inferences, but in his basic perception of reality which reveals itself in value judgments and serves as the foundation for inferences.

Schopenhauer's theory of the syllogism is not an exploration of the form and laws of thought; rather, the syllogism consists: "... in the process of thought itself, and the words and propositions through which it is expressed only indicate the traces it has left behind it."¹⁴ Schopenhauer demonstrates how man intuitively develops judgments through the mental, non-verbal process of syllogistic thought, and then searches for acceptable knowledge and logical form in which to express the newly formed thought. In reality, premises lie in a half-conscious, inarticulate state and are compared with the rest of our stock of knowledge until "... at last the right major finds the right minor, and these immediately take up their proper places, and at once the conclusion exists as a light that has suddenly arisen for us; without any action on our part, as if it

were an inspiration."¹⁵ Before a thought can be communicated, Schopenhauer continues, we must consciously "... go through our stock of knowledge in order to see whether we can find some truth in it in which the newly discovered truth was already implicitly contained..."¹⁶

Schopenhauer's discussion of the syllogism closely resembles current attitudes toward intra-personal communication processes. In 1968, Dean C. Barnlund defined intra-personal communication as:

"... the manipulation of cues within an individual that occurs in the absence of other people (although they may be symbolically present in the imagination). As such, its locus is confined to a single person transacting with his environment. He sees what his purposes require, senses what his organism will admit, associates signs according to the dynamics of his own personality."¹⁷

It is clear that Schopenhauer was ahead of his time in rejecting a complete reliance on classical logical analysis of thought in favor of the more realistic view that communication is an intricate psychological process.

Schopenhauer's short discussion "On Rhetoric" also demonstrates his emphasis on the psychology of communication. He gives a definition of eloquence and two simple rules for more effective communication.¹⁸ He defines Eloquence as "... the faculty of awakening in others our view of a thing, or our opinion about it, of kindling in them our feeling concerning it, and thus putting them in sympathy with us."¹⁹ Schopenhauer's definition and discussion of eloquence is not typical, for the word "communication" could be accurately substituted for "eloquence". The communication theorist today broadly defines the term communication as a process involving the selecting, sorting and sending of symbols in such a way as to help the listener perceive and recreate in his own mind the same meaning as in the mind of the communicator for the purpose of social control. Thus, Schopenhauer is in agreement with current communication theory, for he views communication as a process and as a means of social control: If we are to communicate with others, we must conduct "... the stream of our thoughts into their minds, through the medium of words, with such force as to carry their thought from the direction it has already taken, and sweep it along with ours in its course."²⁰

Schopenhauer's two simple rules for more effective communication exhibit his insight into the psychology of persuasion. The first rule is to "let the premises

¹⁰John Oxenford, "Iconoclasm in German Philosophy," *Westminster Review*, LIX, (April, 1853) pp. 202-212.

¹¹*The World as Will and Idea*, pp. 285-306.

¹²*The World as Will and Idea*, p. 285.

¹³*The World as Will and Idea*, p. 286.

¹⁴*The World as Will and Idea*, p. 294.

¹⁵*The World as Will and Idea*, p. 294.

¹⁶*The World as Will and Idea*, p. 295.

¹⁷Dean C. Barnlund, "Introduction," *Interpersonal Communication: Survey and Studies*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968) p. 8.

¹⁸*The World as Will and Idea*, p. 305.

¹⁹*The World as Will and Idea*, p. 305.

²⁰*The World as Will and Idea*, p. 305.

come first, and the conclusion follow."²¹ The psychological basis for this rule is twofold: first, the communicatee will not become as defensive if he does not know in advance of the outcome of the communicator's reasoning; and second, if the conclusion is left unstated "It will come necessarily and regularly of its own accord into the reason of the hearers, and the conviction thus born in themselves will be all the more genuine, and will also be accompanied by self-esteem instead of shame."²²

Schopenhauer's second rule for effective communication is that true premises rather than half-true or inadequate premises should be used in a dispute. The basis for this rule is that the credibility of the communication source is increased and protected, for true premises cannot be so easily overturned by an opponent.

Schopenhauer understands the art of eloquence to be the correct conveyance of a message that produces the intended response. His interpretation of the syllogism as an intra-personal communication process and his two rules for communication places Schopenhauer in accord with modern communication theory.

Turning to Schopenhauer's consideration of dialectic, we can see that although he departs from the classical understanding of the concept, he often refers to the classical definition of logic and dialectic.²³ He reaffirms the idea that logic deals with the method or reason of thought, and that dialectic is the art of conversing between two intelligent and rational human beings. Schopenhauer also agrees with the ancient archetype that logic is *a priori* to dialectic, but his judgment that man is obstinate, vain, and dishonest makes it necessary for him to distinguish between the ideal - "dialectic" and the reality - "controversial dialectic."

"Controversial dialectic is the art of disputing and of disputing in such a way as to hold one's own whether one is in the right or wrong."²⁴ Such a proclamation does not please Schopenhauer, for "If human nature were not base, but thoroughly honourable, we should in every debate have no other aim than the discovery of truth."²⁵

Schopenhauer draws a comparison between his own position on dialectic and Aristotle's position. He proposes that a sharper distinction be drawn between dialectic and logic than Aristotle draws, because he interprets Aristotle's dialectic to include sophistic, eristic, and perastic reasoning, and, therefore, sees it as "... the art of getting the best of it in a dispute."²⁶

Schopenhauer construes Aristotle's dialectic in this way to advance his own theory, which includes the belief that, unquestionably, the safest plan for getting the best of it in a dispute "... is to be right to begin with; but this in itself is not enough in the existing disposition of mankind, and on the other hand with the weakness of the human intellect, it is not altogether necessary."²⁷ Schopenhauer believes the above statement to be true, because even though a person may be objectively in the right, in the eyes of his opponent and the audience, he may be judged wrong. Therefore, even when a man has truth or thinks he has truth on his side, he must know how to defend that truth. Such a defense demands the knowledge, understanding, and use of stratagems or tricks. This pessimistic judgment derives from Schopenhauer's belief that most men do not seek truth, but rather are interested in the defense of their own propositions.²⁸

In advancing his conception of the stratagems, Schopenhauer gives the rationale for his view of controversial dialectic:

Dialectic is, ... the art of intellectual fencing used for the purpose of getting the best of it in a dispute; ... The science of Dialectic, is mainly concerned to tabulate and analyse dishonest stratagems, in order that in a real debate they may be at once recognized and defeated. It is for this very reason that Dialectic must admittedly take victory, and not objective truth for its aim and purpose.²⁹

I must emphasize that Schopenhauer is not advocating sophistry, for he agrees with Aristotle that one should "cherish truth, be willing to accept reason even from an opponent, and be just enough to bear being proved to be in the wrong should truth lie with him."³⁰ Schopenhauer injects a Machiavellian realism into the argument against classical thinkers by conceding that "even when a man has right on his side, he needs Dialectic in order to defend and maintain it; he must know what the dishonest tricks are in order to meet them; nay, he must often make use of them himself, so as to beat the enemy with his own weapons."³¹

Schopenhauer felt that he was the first theorist to discuss the tricks of human discourse in any systematized way.³² The stratagems can be categorized in the following manner. First, stratagems including both inexactness and coloring in language. The former stratagems arise from unfixed meanings and confusion in terms, while the latter stratagems utilize the connotative meanings of words to deceive the audience or

²¹ *The World as Will and Idea*, p. 305.

²² *The World as Will and Idea*, p. 306.

²³ "The Art of Controversy", p. 551.

²⁴ "The Art of Controversy", p. 553.

²⁵ "The Art of Controversy", p. 554.

²⁶ "The Art of Controversy", p. 558.

²⁷ "The Art of Controversy", p. 558.

²⁸ "The Art of Controversy", p. 555.

²⁹ "The Art of Controversy", pp. 560-561.

³⁰ "The Art of Controversy", p. 592.

³¹ "The Art of Controversy", p. 559.

³² "The Art of Controversy", p. 561. Schopenhauer felt that there is sufficient distinction between his stratagems and Aristotle's topics to claim his effort as a first attempt.

opponent in a way similar to the propaganda device of "glittering generalities." Second, stratagems of censorship; errors in facts, and overstatements and understatements. Third, stratagems of diversion, which operate by diverting attention either to another argument or to an argument with the express purpose of ending the conversation immediately. Fourth, stratagems of manipulation, wherein facts are manipulated through the use of abstraction or coloring, or confusing the subject matter so as to confuse the opponent. Fifth, stratagems of substitution, in which materials extraneous to the discussion are used, or the materials are used in a manner injurious to reflective thinking, such as the use of irony or ridicule.

Schopenhauer's stratagems demonstrate his perception of the consequences of high-level abstractions in human communication. For example, stratagem I "The Extension" posits that the opponent will become confused and open for defeat if the speaker uses the word or phrase of the opponent in a very general sense, while using his own proposition in a narrow sense. Thus, if a word, phrase, or proposition is used in different senses by mixing levels of abstractions, the opponent is likely to become confused.³³ Other stratagems illustrate Schopenhauer's understanding of the basic concept of ego-involvement. The stratagems of "Diversion" suggest that if an individual in a communication situation foresees that he will be proved in the wrong, that individual will either change the subject or, if necessary, terminate the argument in order to protect his ego.³⁴ The ego-involvement notion is basic to Schopenhauer's theory that man and therefore "controversial dialectic" must take victory and not truth as its aim. Now, over one hundred years after Schopenhauer's death, communication theorists are investigating the role of ego-involvement in determining the success or failure of interpersonal communication.

Space does not permit further exploration of the nature of Schopenhauer's stratagems, but it is clear that his thirty-eight stratagems express not only the tricks employed in human debate, but also his advanced psychological observations of human nature as portrayed in the art of speaking.

Schopenhauer's philosophy offers extensive materials for further study into the nature of dialectic, not only

from the argumentative or practical view, but also from philosophical and psychological viewpoint.

Schopenhauer's achievements are worthy contributions to the domain of communication. A classical scholar, fluent in both Greek and Latin, he displays a thorough understanding of the ancient philosophers.³⁵ His views reveal a departure from classical rhetorical theory and an entry into the modern mode of analysis, as he was one of the first theorists to pay close attention to communication psychology.

Schopenhauer was an iconoclast during his time, but his iconoclasm was not limited to the field of communication, for it extended into many other areas of human thought. Schopenhauer's attacks on many of the accepted beliefs of his time, especially Christianity, caused his contemporaries to shun his work. Had it not been for this rejection, the field of speech communication might be further advanced today, for if the rhetoricians of the nineteenth century had known of Schopenhauer's work, they might have more rapidly entered into the modern phase of communication analysis.

Schopenhauer's perception of man influenced his idea of the communication process: the notion of "controversial dialectic," the syllogism as a thought process, and ego involvement all derive from his central thesis that the "Will" is the moving force behind man's desire to seek victory rather than truth as his aim. Schopenhauer's pessimism impels him to look more deeply into communication acts instead of accepting them at face value. His understanding of the psychology of persuasion is similar to the type of analysis that modern communication behaviorists are utilizing in analysis of interpersonal communication situations. Schopenhauer's concepts of controversial dialectic and ego-involvement are also very similar to the basic presuppositions of modern analysis of propaganda devices and mass-media advertising. The field of communication must continue to look to the field of philosophy in its search for the understanding of the influence of man's perception of reality in his communication. In this vein, the field of communication would do well to make closer inspection of Schopenhauer's rhetorical theory.

³³"The Art of Controversy," p. 563 "The Extension. - This consists in carrying your opponent's proposition beyond its natural limits; in giving it as general a signification and as wide a sense as possible, so as to exaggerate it; and, on the other hand, in giving your own proposition as restricted a sense and as narrow limits as you can, because the more general a statement becomes, the more numerous are the objections to which it is open. The defence consists in an accurate statement of the point on essential question at issue."

³⁴"The Art of Controversy," p. 575. "If you observe that your opponent has taken up a line of argument which will end in your defeat, you must not allow him to carry it to its conclusion, but interrupt the course of the dispute in time, or break it off altogether, or lead him away from the subject, and bring him to others."

³⁵In "The Art of Controversy", Schopenhauer shows his familiarity with Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Cicero, and Quintilian, by his continued reference and skillful analysis of their thought.